Milestone No. 2:
Glossary of Key Terms

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1   Introduction

The PAVE Glossary shall define the key terms of the PAVE project to create greater coherence and understanding among the various partners, focus areas and approaches used in our consortium. The glossary is published with reference to the PAVE Theoretical Framework, which offers an extensive overview and discussions of the underlying concepts used in PAVE.

The terms of the glossary have been shared with consortium members and discussed during our Methodology Workshop on September 1 & 2, 2020. Despite the progress made on agreeing on common definitions of our key terms, we are aware that the discussion on terminology is still subject to change as we move into fieldwork and hence we offer this Glossary as a working document: a common starting point that shall guide us but not bind where we need to develop or expand.[1]

2   Definitions of Key Terms

2.1   Extremism

Baseline Cluster A: Cumulative Extremisms (WP3) Definition
In a general sense, extremism is a concept describing a phenomenon that occurs at the margins of, and in opposition to, a centre. Thus, extremist ideologies should be thought about as positions of individuals or groups that define themselves in contrast to a more moderate core. The definition of extremism is therefore dependent on the prevalent attitudes of a society, which set the context and boundaries in which extremism can be conceptualised. Thus, ideological extremism can be defined "in relation to the majority opinion of the affected population on a key ideological dimension." (Walter 2017, 16). Understanding extremism in this way implies that extremism will be context-specific to different types of societies and will therefore vary in time and space, and one position can be considered as moderate in one context but extreme in another. While extremism can, of course, be related to any ideological dimension in a given society, our interest within the context of the PAVE project is primarily on the overall principles of governance of a society and the main methods for achieving change. In the PAVE project proposal, we define extremism in terms of "any ideology that opposes a society's core values and principles" (PAVE 2020, 5). It is, of course, a matter for debate what these core values and principles really are, but the emerging scholarly consensus tends to define extremism in terms of opposition to democratic values and institutions, pluralism, and human rights.
In Neumann's conceptualization, extremism relates to aspirations of racial and religious supremacy: In the context of liberal democracies, this could be applied to "various forms of racial or religious supremacy, or ideologies that deny basic human rights or democratic principles" (Neumann 2013, 874-875). Based on this, distinctions could be made between political extremism and religious extremism (see Aroua 2018, 5). Yet, while Neumann's conceptualization would include religious, ethno-nationalist and right-wing extremisms, it would not include left-wing extremism, where the

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[1] The definition boxes are <u>colour</u>-coded according to the main source of definition used for the specific term. A green header means that the definition is mainly based on the Baseline Studies of the PAVE project. Blue indicates the founding documents of the PAVE project, such as the Grant Agreement as sources. A red header indicates that the definition is derived from external sources exclusively.

dominant social groups are rather classes, and any supremacy would be defined subsequently in class-terms.

A more general definition of extremism is therefore the following, used by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2020): **"Extremism is the advocacy of a system of belief that claims the superiority and dominance of one identity-based 'in-group' over all 'out-groups', and propagates a dehumanising 'othering' mind-set that is antithetical to pluralism and the universal application of Human Rights. […] They may do this through non-violent and more subtle means, as well as through violent or explicit means. Extremism can be advocated by state and non-state actors alike."**

(Based on Lorenzo, Nilsson & Svensson 2020, 6)

2.2 Extremist Ideology

Baseline Cluster A: Cumulative Extremisms (WP3) Definition
"Ideology is relevant for understanding violent extremisms, as extremist groups are distinguishable from one another by their ideology, which shapes the content of their message, their strategies and goals" (European Commission 2017, 11). Although joining a group is often a social phenomenon, the intensification of the faith and beliefs is a process characterised by active personal learning about the new faith or ideology (Sageman 2004, 117). According to Berger (2017), there are three important elements of an extremist ideology: the content, the distribution and the identity. The content refers to the texts employed by the organisation and the values they claim to represent. For the content to resonate and to attract someone, it must appeal at an emotional and affective level. Overall, extremist ideologies contribute to develop a collective identity, guide mobilisation and justify violence (European Commission 2017, 12).   For PAVE we are looking at various extremist ideologies such as religion-based ideologies, identity-based ideologies such as ethno-nationalist or sectarian ideologies, and political ideologies such as right-wing extremism. A particular phenomenon with political or religious based ideologies is 'fundamentalism', which is often related to a core set of guiding literature or scripture with political relevance that a self-styled elite or 'true believers' do not interpret but seek to implement literally.   (Based on Lorenzo, Nilsson & Svensson 2020, 7f)

2.3 Terrorism

In the context of the PAVE project, we consciously chose not to use the term due to its normative and subjective biases; in particular, it is analytically unhelpful as it blurs the distinction between the behavioural tactics of terrorist attacks and a negative denominator for opposition actors.

2.4 Radicalisation

Baseline Cluster A: Cumulative Extremisms (WP3) Definition
Whereas extremism often denotes a particular ideological *structure or status*, the term radicalisation is predominately used to describe the *process* towards extremism. For PAVE we will adopt this distinction, although there is no complete scholarly consensus on this distinction.   The term radicalisation is well established in the social movement literature and is used in a more general sense, describing shifts towards more extreme aspirations as well as tactical shifts towards

more contentious methods (e.g. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2003). It is used also to describe the process from nonviolent to violent means of manifesting aspirations and subsequently escalating the use of violence (e.g. Alimi, Bosi, and Demetriou 2015, 11).

Radicalisation is further used to describe the process of adopting extremist ideas, a notion that has been also described as 'ideological radicalization'. However, as Crone (2016, 590) argues, "in a liberal society, where freedom of speech and opinion—within specific limits defined by the law—is a fundamental right, ideological radicalization is not in itself a problem, but on the contrary a right." Therefore, a case could be made for restricting the focus to only the process of adopting a violent extremist behaviour, also known as 'behavioural radicalization' (Crone 2016, 590).

Timothy Williams (2019, 86) holds that ideological and behavioural radicalisation "co-exist and influence each other". An inclusive definition of radicalisation that entails emotional, cognitive and behavioural dimensions is the **"change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the ingroup" (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 416).**

(Based on Lorenzo, Nilsson & Svensson 2020, 8f; and KCSS, ELIAMEP, FUNDEA & USF 2020, 6)

2.5   Reciprocal Extremism/ Cumulative Extremism

Baseline Cluster A: Cumulative Extremisms (WP3) Definition
For PAVE the terms reciprocal extremism and cumulative extremism will be used as synonyms. **"Reciprocal extremism is used to define situations where different forms of extremisms feed into - and react to each other.** The antagonistic relationship between different forms of extremisms is manifested through the definition of the out-group ('othering') where extremists can play into each other's narratives and activate and maintain stereotypes of the other side. This can reinforce the threat perceptions in the sense that one form of extremism can create increased levels of fear and insecurity, which will prove a point that another form of extremism may have been making about their particular group being under attack. This can enhance the sense of victimhood, which is often part and parcel of the extremists' world-view. In addition, this will also help to legitimise violence, by providing credibility to arguments made for the justification of the use of violence. Reciprocal extremism can also lead to spiralling actions of revenge and counter-attack." The use of victimisation and demonisation of a 'significant other' can be exploited by extremist organisations to mobilise and radicalise supporters. Extremists thus can be in a mutually beneficial relationship, which can lead to a process of reciprocal radicalization (Ebner 2017). The main focus of research on reciprocal extremism is "how the confrontational relationship between opposing social groups can radicalise those involved, possibly resulting in 'spirals of violence' and causing wider trends of social polarisation" (Carter 2017, 7). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the level of reciprocity may vary, and one type of extremism may induce another without necessarily the reverse dynamic occurring. The term reciprocal can be problematic to use in such situations where one form of extremism affects another, but there are no mutual processes of re-enforcement. There may therefore be reasons to question an assumption that reciprocal radicalisation/extremism affects both sides in an equal manner (Bartlett and Birdwell 2013, 9).

The point of departure is the assumption that there may be "a 'symbiotic relationship' between ideologically opposed forms of violent extremism; a relationship that sustains actors who would otherwise struggle to exist independently of one another" (Macklin 2020, 4).

There are three main types of actors that can stand in a reciprocal relationship: individuals, movements (or sometimes organisations), and communities (Carter 2019). Thus, actions by one violent extremist social group may lead to increased participation on another fringe, it may lead to shifts towards (more) violent tactics on an organisational level, or it may lead to increased polarisation on the community-level.

It is, however, necessary to point out that a definitional focus on non-state actors does not preclude paying attention to the policies, institutions and actors on the state side and how this affects reciprocal extremism.

(Based on Lorenzo, Nilsson & Svensson 2020)

2.6 Overlapping Extremisms

Baseline Cluster A: Cumulative Extremisms (WP3) Definition
The term overlapping extremisms was coined by the PAVE consortium to describe the fact that violent extremist movements sometimes draw on several (mutually-enforcing) sources of mobilisation, based on various forms of social group-identities as well as ideological trajectories. Whereas 'reciprocal/cumulative extremisms' develop in antagonism with each other, **the concept of overlapping extremisms describes a multi-layered extremist structure where different sources of extremist mobilisation (religion, tribal ties, ethnicity, political affinity, etc) serve to reinforce each other cumulatively, but within the same movement or community.**
(Based on Lorenzo, Nilsson & Svensson 2020)

2.7 Online vs Offline Radicalisation

Baseline Cluster C: Online vs. Offline Radicalisation (WP5)
Online radicalization is a process of radicalization that is shaped by the interaction via the internet and channelled by the consumption of social media, whereas offline radicalization processes are shaped by interactions in the physical world. A key difference between online and offline radicalisation seems to be that spaces of offline radicalisation are generally identifiable, such as radicalised mosques, educational establishment, and prisons. In contrast, online radicalisation is more diverse and dispersed and it is difficult to both pin-point key venues of concern, as well as devise responses that are effective.
Online platforms, including social media are utilised to spread extremist ideas, such content is increasing incrementally, and it is not limited to a particular religious or other ideology (Conway 2017).
The internet is increasingly becoming a main tool of interaction and networking among people, especially youth. The internet has been important to 'normalise' radical ideas that lead to violent extremism and terrorism (Torok, 2013). As Torok notes the challenge lies in determining "the mechanisms and power relations that underlie this phenomenon of online media used to promote radicalisation, which in some cases can develop into terrorism."(Ibid.)

Maura Conway (2017, p.80) explains that some researchers see the role of the internet in radicalisation as enclosing extremist activity to the realm of the internet and not transmitting into the 'real world'. Here, the internet is portrayed positively because it allows users to 'vent' their "desire to act". (ibid.)

(Based on KCSS, ELIAMEP, FUNDEA & USF 2020, 10ff)

2.8 De-Radicalisation

Baseline Cluster C: Online vs. Offline Radicalisation (WP5)

In a generalized context, "de-radicalisation refers to efforts to counter and oppose the radical doctrine, the ideological positions or interpretations that are utilised to justify radical views as well as violence in their pursuit." (KCSS, ELIAMEP, FUNDEA & USF 2020, 13)

Sub-dimensions related to the concept of de-radicalisation are disruption, disengagement and rehabilitation. **Disruption** is understood as the efforts to stop the radicalization processes from advancing, primarily on the cognitive/ideological dimension also in prevention of adopting violent behaviour. **Disengagement** describes the behavioural dimension change, which means that disengagement efforts are not oriented towards convincing the individual to abandon her/his radical worldview or beliefs, but to convince the radicalised individual to disengage from the violence associated with the radical beliefs. **Rehabilitation** is encompassing both ideological and behavioural dimensions, where de-radicalised and disengaged individuals are undergoing re-integration programs that combine social and economic support that facilitate the individual's return to society or community.

The relevance of society in relation to de-radicalisation is also expressed in a definition that marks de-radicalisation as "a specific kind of societal negotiation between a community and perceived deviants aiming at conflict reduction" (Köhler 2018, 8).

De-radicalisation thus encompasses cognitive/ideological, behavioural and social dimensions and can be defined as **the social, psychological or ideological de-commitment from extremism and violence** (Horgan, 2009; Reinares, 2011).

Yet, the division between behavioural and cognitive elements of de-radicalisation are not always clear as there are inherent challenges to determine whether changes in behaviour match changes in objective/intentions. Some studies show that de-radicalisation processes are affected by the nature and trajectory of radicalisation of the individual. Grip and Kotajoki (2019, 391) hold that the degree of voluntarism, motivations for joining extremist groups (including ideological beliefs) and role and time spent in the organisation are suggested to have an impact on disengagement and reintegration processes.

(Based on and KCSS, ELIAMEP, FUNDEA & USF 2020 18)

2.9 Transnational Dynamics

PAVE Project Definition

Transnational dynamics are defined as processes of exchange that 'transcend' national and state borders. **Transnational dynamics exist where developments and incidences in one place affect or interact with developments in another geographical space.** Examples of transnational dynamics

with regard to violent extremism are diasporas, foreign fighters, transnational mobility of humans, financial flows and economics activities, and organised crime.

Via the internet, ideas can be spread freely and transnational communication is possible in real time.

Online platforms including social media can be utilised to spread extremist ideas. Such content is not limited to a particular religion or ideology (Conway 2017).

(Based on KCSS, ELIAMEP, FUNDEA & USF 2020, 10)

Diasporas are defined through the connection to an original place of origin that through collective memory and mythology carries the notion of the 'homeland'. These communities are described as "exemplary communities of the transnational moment". Sometimes, a feeling of rejection by the host country is grown, which increases the desire towards to the homeland. (Based on Sideri 2008, 34)

Pan-Islamism claims universality and is adhered to Muslims who imagine and project themselves as part of a global umma (community), not bound to their place of origin but as part of a transnational, imagined community of faithful (Güvenich 2018 cited in Perteshi 2020, 11)

Foreign Fighters are defined as individuals who travel to a state other than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in acts of violent extremism or the provision or receiving of training, including in connection with armed conflict.

(Based on OSCE 2014)

2.10 Formal/ Informal Religious Institutions

Baseline Study Cluster B: Interactions Between State and Religious Institutions

Religious institutions, at the local or national level, comprise e.g. religious authorities, interfaith councils, religious figures and preachers (sheikhs, imams, priests etc.), religious teacher associations, faith-based organisations. (PAVE 2020)

Although traditionally religious influence and authority is associated with public figures with official titles (bishop, mufti, etc.) or with specific organised institutions (churches or madrasas), these are not always the most relevant religious interlocutors for a given community. Formal religious interlocutors are sometimes controlled by the government and use official political-religious narratives. They are based on modern institutional legitimacy within a normative framework and are supported by the state structure (Ansart 1999). **Formal institutions are necessarily legal and official. However, in the religious sphere there exist informal and unofficial leaders and institutions. These can be legal or illegal depending on whether they are officially registered as NGOs, companies etc. They influence individuals and groups who are dissatisfied with formal institutions and are in search of alternative narratives, which are often extremist. Such informal institutions are based on traditional or charismatic legitimacy, more than legality. The distinction between legal and illegal, formal and informal is not always clear cut, and grey zones can exist in between.**

Informal religious institutions can evolve by taking advantage of structural and financial weaknesses in the official institutions, and through support from individuals and organisations in the diaspora of the given country or other external influences. (Turcalo & Veljan 2018, 2)

Going beyond the formal religious authorities and formal institutions allows discernment of a much more complex religious landscape, populated by a broad range of actors, voices, and narratives. In many communities and societies, religious leaders' roles transcend spaces, activities, and institutions conventionally demarcated as religious, and a deeper understanding of their roles beyond religion is key. They have influence in a broad range of sectors including governance, human development, economic growth, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. They are likely to be more trusted and to have a more granular understanding of the specific challenges facing their communities than institutions of religious higher learning closely associated with or regulated by the state.

(Kortam et al 2020, 7)

2.11 Community/ Community Leadership

PAVE Project Definition

A community, in its broad sense, can be understood as the "women, men, social groups, and institutions based in the same geographical area and/or on shared interests" (Turcalo & Veljan 2018, 27).

"While 'community' can refer to a physical or geographical area, social psychology has emphasized the importance of the relational aspects of community—the ways in which one's perception of similarity to others or belongingness can provide a psychological sense of community (McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Sarason, 1974). This includes both subgroups that identify with each other on the basis of shared characteristics (e.g., religion or ethnicity), as well as larger encompassing groups that form 'superordinate' communities to which many subgroups belong (e.g. nationality). The discussion of social bonding and social bridging addresses community relations at these two levels (sub-group and superordinate), and leans on the definition of community as a psychological process by which one perceives a sense of membership and belonging in a group." (Ellis & Abdi 2017, 291)

The PAVE project will mainly use the term community as a geographical marker, for example using specific municipalities as the unit of analysis to study meso-level (intra-group) dynamics. "Municipalities provide a good representation of a socio-economic and socio-political 'community' since they serve as a meeting point for local communities, state institutions and other interested agencies (youth groups, local religious leaders, police services, city councils, etc.). Municipalities as units of analysis thus provide an appropriate frame to capture geographic or administrative community where relevant state and local institutions interact with the cultural community." (Morina et al 2019, 7)

Community Leadership:

The PAVE project places particular emphasis on community leaders who are "in a strong position to assist in the identification of, first, the factors that can contribute to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, and second, of potential strategies to prevent or mitigate these processes" (Grossman & Tahiri 2015, 22). These include especially formal and informal leaders at the municipal level, who are vested with a degree of local authority and are engaged with the community on daily basis. These include organisations such as representatives of religious communities (e.g. head imam and the head of religious association's local branch), mayors, other municipal authorities, NGOs and social influencers such as educators or local activists.

The term community leadership is a sensitive term as it can be ridden by gender power dynamics. The PAVE project will adopt a nuanced understanding of leadership which goes beyond local elites in power positions, thus being able grasp the importance of 'social role models' and especially women, who are often restricted to informal leadership roles due to prevailing patriarchal structures that don't allow for the recognition and appreciation of the role of women.

2.12 Resilience

PAVE Project Definition

Resilience is a broadly used term. For political science, one definition is "**the ability of political systems and (in)formal governance arrangements to adjust to changing political and social conditions while keeping their structures intact**" (Carpenter 2008, 6).

However, it should be noted that resilience per se is not inherently normatively good, as repressive governments and corruption may also prove to be resilient systems. Diane Coutu (2002) noted: "…resilience is neither ethically good nor bad. It is merely the skill and capacity to be robust under conditions of enormous stress and change". Others have criticised resilience as an inherently normative concept (Stephens and Sieckelinck 2020; Ungar 2011). These academics argue that the definition of a desirable outcome in face of adversity depends on the attributes valued by those defining resilience – and thus is subject to cultural relativity and inherently framed within the context of a world-view (Ungar 2011 cited in Stephens and Sieckelinck 2020).

The aspect of cultural relativity resonates in critiques of the concept that perceive it as a westernised approach, which assigns the responsibility for coping to the individual and stresses the importance of psychological self-resilience. The application of this 'Western' resilience concept to local contexts of the MENA region often ignores the high importance of collectivity and community in the social realities there (see also Keelan and Browne 2020, 466) and lacks a sensitivity for the local understanding of the term. Especially in the MENA, resilience thus has developed a connotation of passivity and adaptation/coping with negative circumstances, rather than addressing the need to change the root causes of given negative circumstances.

The understanding of resilience as potentially supporting passivity and coping rather than systemic change is taken up by the critique of resilience as de-politicising (Keenan & Browne 2020, Stephens & Sieckelinck 2020) "where the focus is directed towards individuals and communities, ignoring structural situations of injustice or discrimination."(Torrekens & de le Vingne 2020, 29) Accordingly, if resilience is (mis)understood as efforts towards maintaining stability and status quo in contexts of (severe) asymmetric power relations it can de-legitimise and dis-empower efforts to change the status quo towards a more equal and politically inclusive society.

To limit the critique of resilience as de-politicising, the role of agency must be pronounced and highlighted. For PAVE the understanding of resilience includes a facet of resistance – both to emerging signs of radicalization as well as to their root causes (e.g. state disfunction) – as a positive and active form of resilience, thereby including its potential for proactive change. The value of agency within resilience chimes with Jore's recognition of social capital and empowerment (Jore 2020, cited in Stephens & Sieckelinck 2020) and acknowledges the need for political space in a society that allows pluralism and "constructive and democratic engagement on difficult issues, fostering a culture where people can disagree better" (GREASE 2020, 3).

2.13 Community Resilience

Wimelius et al (2018, 12) define community resilience both a process and a capacity. At the core of the concept is a focus on strengths rather than on problems and risks and the strengths can be nurtured and drawn on in times of need. To develop these strength, cooperation and social networks are perceived as central which indicates "that local resilience may be promoted through broad, culturally competent community interventions that strengthen social support networks; that collaborate with community organizations; that enhance community resources; that build collective identity; and that provide training in how to handle uncertainty and risks."

Ellis and Abdi (2017, 291) write that "In relation to violent extremism, the challenge or threat can be understood as the potential for violent extremists to recruit individuals to their cause and potentially even engage in violence; successful adaptation to this threat would be a community that comes together in such a way that its members are no longer vulnerable to the threat. In short, the process of becoming a resilient community would need to inherently reduce potential vulnerabilities or risk factors, and promote protective experiences or conditions." They define community resilience as **a systemic concept encompassing both structural and agency-centred dimensions of communities' capacity to react to the threat of violent extremism, which places a particular emphasis on the role of social connections, social bridging and belonging** (Ellis & Abdi 2017).

According to previous research conducted by several members of the PAVE consortium on the drivers of resilience and vulnerability for violent extremism at the community level in the Western Balkans, resilience is a spectrum and must be perceived in a systemic and holistic manner. Accordingly, a community moves up along the resilience spectrum following the "intervention or active engagement of various stakeholders of the community vested with some authority to either prevent or counter violent extremism. Therefore, resilience assumes awareness of the problem by various stakeholders in a community and their aggregated action to act against a certain phenomenon. It also includes the community's attitude toward such a phenomenon and their reaction in the wake of the emergence of the violent extremism activity, or events perceived as leading up to its appearance" (Jakupi & Kraja 2018, 9). Community resilience therefore encompasses three dimensions of stakeholder agency: awareness, attitude and action (Morina, Austin, Roetman & Dudouet 2019).

2.14 PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism)

In a general context, prevention can be understood as the targeted avoidance of undesirable future events and/or conditions. It can be structured into three aspects: Primary prevention denotes broad measures that are taken to mitigate the risk of such events or conditions prior to concrete indications of their development. Secondary prevention takes place when there are already first indications of undesirable conditions arising and is aimed to avoiding a consolidation thereof. Tertiary prevention is centred around preventing the reoccurrence of undesirable events and/or conditions (Greuel 2018).

In the context of radicalization processes leading to violent extremism, the term PVE was coined to denote more particularly the "**use of non-coercive means to address the drivers and/or root causes of violent extremism**" (Turcalo & Veljan 2018, 28). It was introduced in the policy sphere by the United Nations in its Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism in 2016, in reaction to the concept of

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), defined as "the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives" (Khan 2015).

While CVE encompasses a mixed range of hard security (e.g. counter-terrorism) and civil-society led initiatives dealing with the threat of violent extremism, PVE gives pre-eminence to "systematic preventive steps to address the underlying conditions that drive individuals to radicalize and join violent extremist groups" (UN 2016). The UN action plan emphasises the core nature of PVE as development work with a long-term perspective. PVE as an approach thus is focused more on bottom-up efforts, and seeks to tackle the whole spectrum of 'push and pull factors' leading to radicalization and violent extremism. Many agencies have integrated the UN's approach into their respective guidelines and policies. For example, in its Council Conclusions on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, the European Union acknowledges that "addressing underlying conditions requires a comprehensive whole-of-society approach including consistent outreach to vulnerable populations." (EU Council 2020). "Therefore, policy approaches that aim at addressing the challenge of violent extremism have advanced into the direction of development and peacebuilding by focusing on promotion of equality, inclusiveness and how power is exercised and resources shared (Boutellis and Mahmoud 2017). Today, PVE constitutes a field of theory and practice that regularly crosses disciplinary boundaries and uses a multitude of methodologies and concepts." (Morina et al 2019, 4).

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